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Given the enormity of the short- and long-run fiscal
challenges facing the US, the lack of policy detail from both
presidential candidates is disappointing
In the second part of their analysis of US policy responses to the economic recession,
Ethan Ilzetzki and Jonathan Pinder examine the policy efforts aimed at reducing US
public debt. They argue that proposals put forward by both presidential candidates are
woefully short of specifics. Given the UK’s approach to tackling government debt, this
analysis provides reasons for having a clear plan to avoid political deadlock regarding
unsustainable debt-levels.
There is a cross-party consensus that US public debt levels are a serious problem, at least in the
medium term. Debt levels rose signif icantly in the Great Recession (see Figure 6), but much of  the
increase can be explained by the automatic responses of  public spending and taxes to the state of  the
business cycle.
The more worrying f act is that the long-run debt trend is clearly upwards. Public consumption as a share
of  income has not increased since the 1950s and public investment has actually declined (see Figure 7).
The rise in spending is due to increases in public healthcare (Medicare and Medicaid) and social security
(pensions), up f rom 3% of  GDP in the 1950s to almost 12% today and projected to rise to 16% by
2037. Since tax revenues have not kept up with these spending trends, public debt has been marching
upwards.
In December 2010, the bi-partisan Simpson-Bowles Commission released a majority report proposing a
mixture of  cuts in entit lement spending and tax ref orm, backloaded to avoid exacerbating the recession
(see Table 1 f or the details). Broadly, the commission recommended eliminating most tax deductions,
increasing revenue by about $1.1 trillion.
Part of  this higher revenue would be used to reduce tax rates and overall tax revenues would be targeted
as less than 20% of  GDP in the long run. The remainder would be allocated to debt reduction. Social
security would be brought into balance through broadening payroll tax bases and increasing the
retirement age. Simpson-Bowles recommended setting targets to contain Medicare’s growth beyond
2020 (unf ortunately without much detail) and containing discretionary spending growth to half  the rate of
inf lation.
Although the Commission’s proposals are broadly seen as the starting point f or any serious ref orm,
President Obama did not f ully embrace it and Paul Ryan, a commission member and now Mitt Romney’s
running mate, explicit ly voted against it. The Simpson-Bowles commission did not obtain the super-
majority required to bring f orward legislation.
Polit ical conf lict peaked in the summer of  2011 over the ‘debt ceiling’. Congress not only approves tax
and expenditure laws but also sets a limit to total government debt. As US f ederal debt approached this
limit in July 2011, Congress was unable to reach an agreement on a change to the debt ceiling.
Republicans demanded that increases in the debt ceiling be linked to legislation on spending restraint.
Democrats insisted that the debt ceiling be increased unconditionally or f or the agreement to include tax
increases (Woodward, 2012). With no ‘grand bargain’ on resolving longer-term debt problems, agreement
was reached to raise the debt ceiling temporarily and to f ind a compromise on longer-term challenges
over the coming year.
To give incentives to both sides to arrive at a long-term compromise, the legislation required automatic
public spending cuts – the Budget Control Act – to be triggered in 2013 if  no agreement is reached by
then. The spending cuts were designed to target the essential priorit ies of  both parties to f orce the two
sides to an agreement.
With the presidential election approaching, no attempt has been made to f ind an alternative to the
‘sequester ’ scheduled in the Budget Control Act. With no change in legislation f ollowing the November
elections, the sequester will be triggered in January 2013.
In addition to the spending cuts in the Budget Control Act, the ‘Bush tax cuts’ of  2001 expire at the end
of  2012.[1] The combination of  these two f actors is known as the ‘f iscal clif f ’ (see Table 2), which will
mean that taxes rise by about 2.7% of  GDP and spending f alls by almost 1%. This f iscal contraction of
close to 3.7% in 2013 relative to current plans would almost certainly plunge the US into recession, even
on the most optimistic estimates.[2] (Citibank f orecasts a 1% decline in GDP and unemployment returning
to 9% in this scenario.)[3]
To make things worse, the law does not address the root causes of  the US debt problem – healthcare
and pensions. If  the economy f alls over the f iscal clif f , it  will cut only discretionary spending, which is not
the main cause of  the long-run debt problem.
The candidates’ f iscal policy proposals
No presidents can implement their budgets unmodif ied. The Republicans will almost certainly control the
House of  Representatives and the Democrats are expected to retain the Senate.[4] Whoever wins the
presidential election is likely to f ace divided government.
Fiscal policy in the short run
As discussed above, the aggressive monetary and f iscal action during the nadir of  the Great Recession
helped avoid a repeat of  the 1930s. Furthermore, immediate action on the debt level is unwarranted as
real interest rates on US Treasury Bills are at historic lows. There is no correlation between US debt
levels and market interest rates and there are currently no serious market f ears of  US sovereign def ault
(see Figure 8).
Governor Romney’s platf orm calls f or an immediate 5% cut in non-def ence discretionary spending and
he was strongly against President Obama’s proposed second stimulus programme. The Republicans’
plan f avours tax cuts that go beyond extending the Bush tax rates.
President Obama’s recent rhetoric has indicated that he too is currently more dedicated to contracting
rather than expanding public expenditures, but Democrats are keener to have military expenditures share
the burden of  spending cuts. The President and Congressional Democrats have generally expressed
support f or extending the Bush tax cuts, except f or higher- income households.
Both candidates have expressed a desire to avoid the f iscal clif f . Congressional leaders are already
negotiating details of  an agreement and it is probable that some agreement will be reached to postpone
the sequester and prolong the 2001 tax cuts f or most households bef ore the January 2013 deadline.
This would allow whoever is president some time to reach a broader bargain. But the enormous polit ical
uncertainty this engenders does the economy no f avours.[5]
Fiscal policy in the long run: taxes
The Republicans’ plan would extend all of  the Bush tax cuts indef initely (at an annual cost of  $450
billion), reduce marginal income taxes by an additional 20% (at an additional cost of  $250-480 billion) and
reduce corporate tax rates f rom 35% to 25%.[6] To f inance these cuts, there would be an elimination of
unspecif ied tax deductions. These estimates may overstate the budgetary cost of  these tax cuts if  lower
tax rates stimulate economic growth.[7] Current evidence on the incentive ef f ects of  lower taxes on the
rich do not give cause f or such optimism, particularly as income inequality is already so high in the
US.[8] Indeed, US growth was not spectacular in the period af ter the 2001 tax cuts were implemented.
But even allowing f or generous growth ef f ects of  tax cuts and assuming elimination of  deductions is
But even allowing f or generous growth ef f ects of  tax cuts and assuming elimination of  deductions is
f easible – a best case scenario – Governor Romney’s tax ref orm will contribute nothing to reducing the
def icit but everything to f inancing tax cuts.
The most detailed inf ormation available on President Obama’s plans is in the 2013 budget proposal. His
tax ref orm would eliminate tax breaks f or ‘millionaires’ and reduce the tax rate applied to deductions to a
maximum of  28% f or households with incomes exceeding $250,000. President Obama also proposes
making the Bush tax cuts permanent f or households earning less than $250,000, but allowing them to
expire f or others.
Combined, these ref orms are estimated to increase revenues by $150 billion a year, 1% of  GDP.[9] These
alone would be insuf f icient to close the budget gap in the long run and come on top of  extending the
Bush tax cuts f or lower-earning households, costing $350 billion a year.
Fiscal policy in the long run: spending
Governor Romney and his running mate have proposed capping public spending at 20% of  GDP and to
do so through cuts in discretionary non-def ence spending and through restraint in entit lement spending.
The main driver of  long-run debt increases is healthcare.[10] The ‘Ryan plan’ proposes that f rom 2023,
seniors will be provided with vouchers to buy health insurance f rom private insurers or f rom Medicare
itself . The value of  the vouchers will be linked to a price determined through competit ive bidding[11] with
the aim of  reducing Medicare costs through sharper competit ion among insurers.
But if  healthcare cost inf lation is due to increasing demand (Hall and Jones, 2007) or a rise in the
underlying costs of  healthcare provision, such competit ion may have litt le ef f ect. As a backstop, Paul
Ryan proposes capping Medicare spending at a growth rate 0.5% above the rate of  GDP growth af ter
2023.
President Obama is committed to implementing his Af f ordable Care Act which combines expansion of
coverage with controls over the growth of  Medicare expenditure, through f or example, lower
reimbursement rates f or hospital services. The Congressional Budget Of f ice (CBO, 2011) estimates that
the law will result in a net reduction in f ederal def icits of  $118 billion f rom 2010 to 2019. Governor
Romney is committed to repealing the Af f ordable Care Act.
There is lit t le inf ormation on what either candidate would do on social security ref orm. Media reports
suggest that the candidates allow the possibility of  increasing the retirement age – an almost inevitable
ref orm.
Conclusions
Given the enormity of  the short-  and long-run f iscal challenges f acing the US, the lack of  policy detail
f rom both presidential candidates is disappointing. The init ially aggressive action by policy-makers in the
Great Recession was impressive, but polit ical gridlock since then has hampered attempts to deal with the
f iscal challenge. The Simpson-Bowles proposals should be the starting point in this debate with a clear
need to specif y more clearly how to raise tax revenues and contain healthcare and social security costs.
This is the second part of two of the Centre for Economic Performance’s (CEP) US election
analysis on Recession and Recovery: The US Policy Debate on Taxes, Spending and Public Debt.
All of the papers in the series can be accessed here.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor
of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
About the authors
Ethan Ilzetzki is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the LSE.
Jonathan Pinder is a PhD student at the LSE.
For further information:
Contact: Ethan Ilzetzki (E.Ilzetzki@lse.ac.uk) or Romesh Vaitilingam (romesh@vaitilingam.com). The
Centre f or Economic Perf ormance (CEP) is a non-prof it, polit ically independent research institution
f unded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (similar to the US NSF). CEP’s director is John
Van Reenen (j.vanreenen@lse.ac.uk).
Table 1: The Simpson-Bowles Commission’s proposals
Tax policy
Income taxes Eliminate most ‘income tax expenditures’, that is, all deductions f rom
income taxes. Current income tax expenditures are estimated at $1.1 trillion
annually. Use part of  the savings to lower tax rates, limiting the top income
tax rate to 29% and maintaining or increasing the progressivity of  the tax
code.
Payroll taxes Increase social security taxes to cover 90% of  income by 2050.
Corporate
taxes
Lower the corporate tax to no higher than 29%. Eliminate all ‘tax
expenditures’ f or businesses. Move to a territorial tax system.
Revenues Revenues to increase gradually, stabilising at just under 20% in the long
run.
Expenditure policy
Discretionary Hold spending in 2012 equal to or lower than spending in 2011 and return
spending to 2008 levels in real terms in 2013. Limit f uture spending growth
to half  the projected inf lation rate through 2020. Require equal cuts f rom
both security and non-security spending.
Medicare and
social security
The commission only proposes small f ixes to Medicare in the short run,
while setting targets to contain the programme’s rate of  growth af ter 2020.
Increase the social security retirement age to 67 by 2027 and index the
retirement age to average lif e expectancy thereaf ter. Index social security
benef its to chain- indexed CPI. The plan is projected to close the social
security shortf all over a 75-year horizon.
Deficit
Reduce the def icit gradually to 2.3% by 2015, with most def icit reductions
scheduled to coincide with economic recovery. Putting in place a credible
plan to stabilise the debt over t ime, with debt (held by the public) stabilising
at around 65% of  GDP in 2020, af ter peaking at 72% in 2013.
 
Table 2: The ‘f iscal clif f ’:
changes in tax and expenditures policy scheduled in current law 
Tax policy
Revenues Total revenue as a share of  GDP projected to rise f rom 15.7% of
GDP (2012) to 18.4% (2013) and 20.3% (2015). Personal income tax
take to increase by 1.8% of  GDP, social security taxes by 0.5% of
GDP and corporate income taxes by 0.4% of  GDP.
Income taxes Scheduled to rise automatically f rom 2013, reversing the 2001 tax
cuts. Tax rates to rise f rom 10-15%, 25%, 28%, 33% and 35% to
15%, 28%, 31%, 36%, 39.6%, respectively
Payroll taxes Temporary payroll tax cut of  2 percentage points is set to lapse
Capital gains taxes Scheduled to rise f rom 15% to a maximum rate of  20% f or most
taxpayers f rom 2013.
Expenditure policy
Total Total outlays projected to f all f rom 22.9% of  GDP (2012) to 22.4%
(2013) and 21.5% (2015). The Budget Control Act has def ence and
non-def ence budgets f alling by $55 billion each year f rom 2013 to
2022 (0.7% of  GDP in 2013).
Def ence $55 billion of  cuts, almost entirely discretionary spending, amounting
to 10% of  discretionary def ence spending in 2013. These cuts are
not restored in f uture years but, as the economy and the size of  the
def ence budget grow, they f all to 8.5% of  the planned discretionary
def ence budget in 2022.
Medicare, Medicaid
and social security
Medicare is shielded f rom cuts: 90% of  Medicare spending can only
be cut by a maximum of  2%; a f urther 9% is exempt entirely. Medicare
and social security are exempt f rom cuts. In January 2013, doctors’
payments under Medicare are due to f all by 27%. These cuts have
been reversed by Congress each year since 2003 (the ‘doc f ix’).
Under current law, these cuts to payments would reduce
expenditures by $10 billion.
Unemployment
benef its
Extensions in emergency unemployment benef it are set to lapse.
Total expenditure on unemployment benef it is set to f all by over a
third f rom $94 billion to $60 billion in 2013, despite a baseline CBO
scenario that has unemployment rising over the course of  the next
year.
[1] The tax cuts were init ially legislated to expire af ter ten years and have been subsequently extended.
[2] Current US GDP growth is approximately 1.5%. In a review of  the literature on expenditure
multipliers, Ramey (2011) gives a consensus view centred around unity. A $110bn cut in public spending
would cut GDP growth by approximately 0.7%. Even under a more conservative estimate of  0.4 (Barro
and Redlick, 2011), this f igure would be approximately 0.3%. Romer and Romer (2010) estimate a tax
multiplier exceeding 2. Using a f ar more conservative estimate of  0.5 would be enough to eliminate
entirely the 1.5% GDP growth rate, given a tax increase of  2.7% of  GDP.
[3] Citi Research, U.S. Macro Focus of  21/9/12.
[4] The Intrade betting market puts the probability of  Democratic control over the Senate at 62% (10
October 2012).
[5] See CEP’s US Election Analysis on economic recovery and policy uncertainty.
[6] These are conservative estimates. Extending the Bush tax cuts would cost $4.5 trillion over ten years
according to the CBO. The additional reduction in marginal rates would cost $250 billion per year, even if
it  only applied to those earning above $200,000. Cutting the corporate tax rate would cost $96 billion a
year (see brookings.edu). We assume, as do most estimates that these latter costs will be f ully covered
by broadening the corporate tax base and eliminating tax loopholes, although no specif ics have been
provided about these plans. If  Romney cuts taxes at this rate f or all households, the cost would be
higher, at $480 billion.
[7] The Tax Foundation estimates that the 60% of  the revenues lost due to the Romney tax cuts would
be recovered through higher growth.
[8] For example, see Piketty et al (2011) and CEP’s US Election Analysis on inequality.
[9] According to the CBO, capping deductions will save $50 billion a year and allowing the Bush tax cut to
expire will save $100 billion a year.
[10] See also CEP’s US Election Analysis on healthcare ref orm f or more detailed analysis.
[11] Formally, insurance companies and Medicare will post their insurance premia and the second-to- least
expensive will determine the value of  the vouchers. This is unless Medicare posts the lowest bid, in which
case vouchers will be set to cover the costs of  Medicare itself . Recipients will then be entit led to use
their voucher to choose among the alternative plans, while paying or pocketing the dif f erence in price.
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. Poorly targeted short term init iatives to revive the UK’s f lagging growth rates are likely to make
things worse. Consistency in economic policy is key in delivering long-term growth. (32)
2. The current jobs crisis is the result of  a lack of  business conf idence and a shortage of  consumers
with money to spend. The government needs to create a long-term f ramework to drive innovation
and raise productivity across the economy (25.7)
3. Polit ical pressure may encourage ‘responsible capitalism’ in the short term. But more competit ion
and higher educational standards are needed in the long term. (25.5)
4. With an easing of  f iscal policy of f  the cards, George Osborne’s only hope f or growth may lie with
another round of  quantitative easing (25.4)
